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Issues 
This past year was not a stellar one for agricultural biotechnology.  The industry discovered that 
consumer preferences have little to do with science and a lot to do with perceived benefits and 
risks.  And it became increasingly clear that the technological capacity to create crops designed 
for specific end users may not fit well with a marketing and transportation system designed for 
high volume and undifferentiated products.  The problems encountered by the biotech industry in 
1999 may be mere bumps in the road to be resolved in the near future.  Or they may presage real 
limits on the application of biotechnology.  What is apparent, however, is that the future of 
agricultural biotechnology will rest on a much clearer understanding of its benefits and costs – 
on winners and losers. 
In this paper we explore this topic by considering how advances in crop biotechnology 
might influence land rental rates and land values.  No attempt is made to determine what is "fair" 
or "unfair."  Instead, the emphasis is on understanding the likely impacts techno-innovations may 
have on the distribution of returns to land.  If biotechnology follows a path similar to other 
technological innovations in agriculture, some of the benefits will be passed on to consumers, 
some will be retained by agribusiness firms, and some will be captured by the surviving farm 
operators.  Any remaining benefits will be bid into rental rates or land values.  Historically, land 
has been the residual claimant for gains from technology.  Will biotechnology change this 
relationship?  Will land owners be the primary beneficiaries – or will the benefits accrue to 
another group(s) within the food and agricultural sector? 
 
Determinants of Land Value 
A simple model of land value determination helps.  For this purpose, land may be compared to a 
growth stock – an asset that generates current returns (rental rates or net returns to land use), and 
also capital gains or losses.  This is a reasonable characterization because buying land brings the 
rights to an uncertain stream of rental or land use returns that continues into perpetuity.  
Farmland will be an attractive investment as long as its expected rate of return is high relative to 
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other possible investments.  The process of bidding for land will cause values to increase or 
decrease until its rate of return comes in line with other comparably risky investments (Lence 
and Miller). 
 
Who Owns Farmland? 
Higher farmland rental rates benefit owners by enhancing their current incomes as well as their 
wealth, as higher returns or higher rental rates are bid into land values.  The gains to owners 
come at the expense of tenants and new entrants, who must pay higher prices for land.  Farmland 
ownership and tenure, then, are major determinants of the distribution of the gains and losses 
arising from land value changes. 
A recent study by Pieper and Harl identified patterns of farmland ownership in Iowa.  
Table 1 shows who owned Iowa farmland in 1982 and 1997.  In 1997, 90 percent of the farmland 
was owned by individuals or through their estates or trusts.  Corporations and limited liability 
companies owned 10 percent.  However, Table 2 shows that less than 40 percent of Iowa’s 
farmland was operated or farmed by its owner.  The remainder was rented.  Table 2 also reveals 
a striking shift from ownership toward land rental between 1982 and 1997. 
According to Table 3, slightly more than one-third of all farmland owners considered 
their principal occupation to be farmers or farm managers.  The next largest occupational group 
(28.4 percent) was women employed on the farm or in the home.  Table 4 reveals that nearly 40 
percent of farmland was owned by people over 65 years of age, so farmland likely is a source of 
retirement income. 
In the future, it seems likely that farmland ownership will remain fragmented, as shown 
in Table 1.  Given the significant trend toward more land rental and less ownership by farm 
operators reported in Table 2, it also seems reasonable to conclude that farm operators will likely 
rent significantly more land than they own.  Consequently, any increase in rental rates and the 
increase in land values stemming from technological innovations will likely impact the majority 
of farm operators more as increased costs rather than as increased wealth. 
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Technological or Organizational Changes Affect Land Values 
Relatively little evidence documents the linkages between technologies, organizational changes, 
and land rental rates and values.  However, a few hypothetical cases can be used to speculate 
about them. 
A value chain in the agricultural industry displays the desired relationships (Figure 1).  
Each stage in the chain creates value as inputs are transformed into new materials or final goods.  
The following examples show how much of the value added at a particular stage is captured at 
that stage and how much is passed up or down the chain.  The value moving along the chain 
depends on several factors, such as the degree of competition, the nature of the innovation, the 
bargaining position of the parties, and the nature of the property rights. 
Although the above issues are relevant for any technological innovation, new 
biotechnology may change how value is created and distributed along the value chain.  New 
biotechnology is characterized by high-cost, high-risk research primarily done by the private 
sector.  The cost and risk has required the research firms to develop new institutional 
arrangements that allow them to capture value that is added at several or all points along the 
supply chain.  This is accomplished largely through the use of patents, contracts, and licenses – 
legal instruments that create a partial monopoly – or through direct ownership of the supply 
chain (Moschini and Lapan).  These characteristics of new biotechnology are in stark contrast 
with those of the technologies responsible for the unprecedented crop productivity gains 
experienced since World War II.  The latter technologies increased the production of bulky, 
undifferentiated commodities.  Further, many of them have been the result of public-funded 
research, and most of them were made available through simple market mechanisms. 
 
Input Traits 
Input trait biotechnology introduces genes into crops with the purpose of modifying their input 
requirements.  A typical example is Monsanto’s Roundup Ready® (RR) gene in soybeans.  In 
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order to use this technology, farmers must pay for the seed, agree not to save seed, and to 
purchase only patent-protected Roundup herbicides.  Farmers may also receive a lower price, 
because genetically modified soybeans frequently sell at a discount.  In return, farmers gain 
simple and effective weed control at lower cost.  In addition, the time and equipment required for 
weed control may be reduced, permitting an operator to farm more land. 
An operator adopting RR soybeans may attempt to rent or buy more land if by doing so 
he expects a higher net return.  To farm more land, he has to bid it away from other farmers, 
thereby increasing rental rates and land values.  After the dust settled, the operator would pay 
more per acre rented, and run a larger business as measured by volume.  If a sufficient number of 
farmers make this decision, land values and rental rates will increase as a consequence of the 
new production technology.  Operators whose returns for land use cannot justify the higher rental 
rates will eventually quit farming.  On balance, the remaining operators should be at least as well 
off as they were prior to adopting this technology.  If not, they will adjust by bidding less for 
land or shifting to alternative crops or production practices.  The landowners – operators as well 
as landlords – benefit from this technological innovation because their earnings, from farming or 
from land rental rates, increase. 
However, the RR technology is controlled by a single life science firm with a strong 
incentive to keep as much of the value created as possible.  Since this firm would only need to 
offer RR technology at prices just attractive enough to steer farmers away from alternative 
technologies, the increased returns to land due to RR soybeans will likely be modest, as would 
impacts on land values and rental rates. 
An input trait biotechnology by itself seems to allow its developer to capture most of the 
value it creates.  Land is an unlikely residual claimant in this value chain.  Instead, the patent 
bundle protecting the trait may now play this role.  If operators have a choice from among 
several technologies, the supplier of any one must compete against suppliers of the alternatives.  
The more competitive the market for new technologies, the more likely at least some of the 
associated value will be captured by providers of relatively fixed inputs like land and managerial 
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skills.  Competitive markets for new technologies are more likely to translate into higher rental 
rates and increased land values. 
 
Output Traits 
Output traits result from genes introduced into crops to make them more attractive from the 
buyer's standpoint.  Examples include corn with higher oil content, soybeans with altered fatty 
acid composition, and crops engineered to produce pharmaceuticals or other high-value 
compounds.  Output-trait crops need to be kept separate as they move through marketing 
channels.  One method to achieve this, identity preservation, relies on a series of contracts to 
manage production and distribution of the crop along the value chain.  A second method relies 
on testing and sorting of bulk commodities at the point of sale.  In this latter approach, 
production contracts and monitoring are less important and would probably not be needed. 
 Output-trait biotechnology can bring unusual results.  Suppose that an U.S. food 
processor identifies a foreign market for one of its organically grown food grade soybeans with a 
unique nutrient composition.  The company contracts for 500,000 acres within a 100-mile radius 
of its U.S. processing plant to meet the needs of its customers.  Would this innovation influence 
land values and rental rates?  If growing these special beans meant higher production costs, the 
food processor would be required to offer a contract attractive enough to bid farmers away from 
their current conventional crop operations.  In general, however, farmers would be only slightly 
better off than before after accounting for all production costs.  Further, the acreage needed for 
this specialty crop is relatively small and in the example, fixed.  The net impact on land values 
from this one innovation would likely be modest. 
 In another example, a seed company introduces a high-protein corn variety that is of great 
value to livestock producers and requires no change in production practices.  Further, the high 
protein level can be identified by a simple test.  The seed company needs to recover its 
development cost, plus its usual production costs.  Farmers add no more value to the chain than 
they do for the prevailing corn variety.  Will this output trait impact land values and rental rates?  
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Again, farmers are unlikely to adopt this technology if they are not made better off.  However, 
they need to be offered just enough to shift varieties.  The additional value will be captured by 
those firms in the chain that create it – the seed company and the processing and distribution 
company.  Land values will not be significantly affected by this output-trait innovation.  In 
economic terms, output-trait technologies of this type are not different from traditional yield-
increasing technologies, as they simply increase the yield of a component of the crop. 
 
Conclusion 
New technologies and organizational changes will have an impact on land values and rental 
rates.  However, it is difficult to distinguish such impacts from, for example, the overall impact 
of the increasing global demand for food.  The former may have a negligible impact on land 
values and rental rates, whereas the traditional forces of growing demand, generally improved 
production technology, and macroeconomic conditions may continue to be the stronger forces. 
 It seems reasonable to conclude that, if there are few suppliers of technological 
innovations, most of the direct value creation will be captured by the developers and suppliers of 
the technology.  In such instances, it is unlikely that innovations will result in markedly higher 
rental rates and land values.  In contrast, if there are many suppliers of alternative technological 
innovations, the suppliers will transfer at least some of the value creation to farm operators, and 
eventually to the owners of the land. 
If U.S. farmland ownership and tenure characteristics remain similar to those of Iowa 
farmland, it may be safely concluded that those who benefit the most from land value increases 
tend to be elderly landowners.  The operators who are most efficient in the adoption and use of 
the new technologies and contractual arrangements are also likely to benefit, but to a smaller 
extent.  The losers would be those operators who depend on rented land – in most instances 
young or mid-career commercial farmers - and who are not efficient enough to stay in business 
in a new economic environment. 
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Whatever the ultimate impact of biotechnology and the accompanying organizational 
change on land values and rental rates, however, it is clear that untangling their benefits and 
costs will remain an important and essential task for agricultural economists in the foreseeable 
future. 
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Table 1.  Farmland Ownership in Iowa, 1982 and 1997. 
 
Ownership Type 1982  1997  
  (Percent of Farmland)   
Sole owners 41.1  31.2  
Husband and wife (joint) 38.7  39.1  
Other joint/co-owners 7.3  5.6  
Partnerships 0.3  4.0  
Estates 3.8  2.7  
Trusts 0.8  7.4  
Corporations 8.0  5.3  
Limited liability companies 0.0  4.7  
Source:  Pieper and Harl, 1999. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Tenure of Operators of Iowa Farmland, 1982 and 1997. 
 
Tenure 1982  1997  
  (Percent of Farmland)   
Operated solely by owner 54.1  30.8  
Operated by owner with help 0.9  7.8  
Operated under cash rent lease 21.1  34.9  
Operated under crop share lease 21.1  23.7  
Operated under other lease arrangement 1.0  2.8  
All others 2.7  0.0  
Source:  Pieper and Harl, 1999. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.  Percent of Iowa Farmland Owners by Principal Occupation, 1997. 
 
Tenure 1997  
Farmers/farm managers 38.6  
Farmwives/housewives 28.4  
Professional/technical 12.8  
Clerical 3.5  
All others 16.7  
Source:  Pieper and Harl, 1999. 
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Table 4.  Age and Gender in Iowa Non-Corporate Farmland Ownership, 1997. 
 (Percent of Farmland Owned) 
 
Tenure Age (years) 
 Under 35  35-65  Over 65  All  
Males 1.6  31.0  19.0  51.5  
Females 1.0  25.5  19.6  46.1  
Total 2.5  56.6  38.6  97.7  
Note:  Totals do not add to 100 percent due to omission of minor categories. 
Source:  Pieper and Harl, 1999. 
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Figure 1.  Agricultural Value Chain. 
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